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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

s

GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ,

t

Case No. 900484-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Petitioner. :
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Court's request, the State submits this
brief in response to defendant's petition for rehearing.

A

petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court has
overlooked pertinent facts or law, or has misapplied or
misinterpreted the law.

See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,

172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).
ARGUMENT
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT I
This Court should decline defendant's invitation to
assume the trial court made findings of fact in accordance with
its conclusion that a pretext stop occurred and to affirm the
suppression order.

The trial court's findings of fact are

inadequate under State v. Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah App.
1990), and, contrary to defendant's suggestion, this Court cannot
reasonably assume the trial court actually made findings
necessary to support the pretext conclusion, see State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991).

As is evident from the briefs filed by both parties,
there are a number of ambiguities in this record, and it is the
trial court's obligation to sort out those ambiguities and to
enter clear findings of fact.

Just as in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at

788, the record evidence does not clearly support the trial
court's ruling, and therefore the remand ordered by this Court is
appropriate.

See also State v. Vigil, 817 P.2d 1296, 1301-02

(Utah App. 199l).1

Therefore, rehearing should be denied on

1

In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Russon
argues that there is no need to remand for more complete findings
in light of the undisputed evidence that the officer stopped
defendant for making a turn without signaling and driving without
a driver's license, violations of state statutes and offenses for
which officers routinely stop drivers. State v. Lopez, No.
900484-CA, slip op. at 19 and n.l (Utah App. Mar. 2, 1992)
(Russon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah App. 1989)). However,
the trial court's written findings of fact are not sufficiently
clear as to the officer's prior contacts with defendant and the
officer's observation of an improper turn to support Judge
Russon's argument, even though the State obviously would favor
his approach.
The trial court's findings of fact, as written, suggest
that the court did not believe certain parts of the officer's
testimony — e.g., the court found (1) that "[t]here was no
testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer
Hamner as being named or going by the name of Jose Cruz," and (2)
that "Officer Hamner observed defendant make a left turn and says
he did not see a signal," Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 2 (R. 28) (emphasis added). Thus, it is not clear this
Court was free to state as an unqualified fact that "[tjhe
individual Officer Hamner believed to be Cruz had also introduced
himself to Officer Hamner," Lopez, slip op. at 2, or to observe
that "[t]he trial court intimated nothing which would suggest the
court found [Officer Hamner's] testimony not credible," id. at 11
n.12. In short, the trial court's poorly drafted findings, which
refer to testimony or the absence thereof on certain points
(rather than making an actual finding on the question of fact —
e.g., "The court finds that defendant did not ever represent
himself as being named or going by the name of Jose Cruz" or "The
court finds that defendant did not [or did] signal before he made
a turn"), are inadequate and require clarification.
2

this issue.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT II
Defendant's argument concerning burden of proof does
not present grounds for rehearing.

It simply reflects

dissatisfaction with the rule constructed by the Court, without
citation to any controlling authority that compels a different
rule.

Accordingly, the Court should not grant rehearing on the

burden of proof issue.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT III
The Court should grant rehearing on the issue of what
role an officer's subjective intent plays in the pretext
analysis.

Defendant correctly points out that the majority's

opinion on this subject is extremely confusing.

The State agrees

with defendant, albeit for different reasons, that the majority's
analysis is internally inconsistent and requires clarification.
The majority began its analysis of the subjective
intent question by correctly stating the law:

"[T]he issue of

whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop cannot turn on the issue
of an officer's subjective intent, but rather, must turn on the
objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop under the same circumstances absent the illegal
motivation. . . . Further, a forus on an individual officer's
subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext
would violate the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the
Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police
activity."

State v. Lopez. No. 900484-CA, slip op. at 10 (Utah
3

App. Mar. 2, 1992).

It then properly concluded that "[t]he trial

court incorrectly focused on the officer's subjective motivation
while ignoring whether the officer would have made the stop
regardless of that motivation."

.Id. at 11. However, in its

discussion of "relevant evidence" which follows these correct
statements and application of the law, the majority's analysis
begins to break down.
Throughout its opinion, the majority appears to define
the "would have stopped" prong of the pretext test as whether the
particular officer or officers in general routinely stop for the
offense in issue.

For example, in discussing what evidence is

relevant to the pretext inquiry, the majority stated:
Simply put, if an officer testifies to
routinely making stops for a particular
offense, it tends to show the stop was
objectively reasonable; if the officer admits
to having never before stopped a driver for
the offense, it tends to show a reasonable
officer would not have made the stop. . . .
In addition to evaluating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the traffic stop, a
trial court may also properly consider
evidence of the normal practices of other
police officers under similar circumstances,
as well as indications of departmental
policy.
Lopez, slip op. at 14. When analyzing the burden of proof issue,
it observed:
[B]ecause the State has the primary access to
most of the relevant evidence, including the
officer's past stop practices and the
practices of other officers, we believe the
burden of proof is properly placed on the
State. . . . The State may easily meet its
burden by introducing the testimony of the
arresting officer's justifications for the
actual stop and the officer's normal
4

practices. Absent some concession that the
stop was outside normal practice, this may be
all that is necessary. . . . A defendant
might also rebut the State's evidence by
introducing evidence that other officers
normally do not stop vehicles for the same
infractions or that stopping for such
infractions is at odds with departmental
policy or practice. • . . Only a small
minor ty of traffic stop cases implicate the
pretext doctrine when the focus is on
"whether a reasonable officer would have made
the stop absent the illegal motivation." In
clear-cut cases, as mentioned earlier, of
driving eighty miles-per-hour in a school
zone or consuming alcohol while driving,
common knowledge suggests that reasonable
officers everywhere routinely stop such
offenders. In such cases, the pretext
doctrine cannot be asserted in good faith and
can be dismissed quickly by trial judges.
Id. at 15-16 and nn. 17 & 18. The apparent sum total of the
majority's statements is that the "would have stopped" prong is
decided by determining whether the stop for the particular
violation is consistent with usual or routine police practice.
Indeed, that is precisely the test the Tenth Circuit enunciated
in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988),
a case cited by the majority as support for retention of the
pretext doctrine, see Lopez, slip op. at 5, 6.
Nevertheless, in a mystifying footnote, the majority,
while acknowledging the Court's previous statement that the
officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant2, holds that
evidence of an officer's subjective intent is "relevant to what a
reasonable officer would do under the circumstances."
2

Lopez,

State v. Sierra, 752 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988),
disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990).

5

slip op. at 12 n.14.

In reaching this conclusion, the majority

notes that Sierra "correctly observed an officer's subjective
intent is not the relevant legal standard or inquiry a court
should use to determine if a stop is pretextual," but explains
that "this statement was not made in the context of what evidence
may be relevant to what a reasonable officer would do under the
circumstances,"

Ibid,

This cannot be true, for the entire

pretext doctrine is premised upon what the hypothetical
reasonable officer would do under the circumstances.
754 P.2d at 977-79; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517.

See Sierra,

Put another way,

the "legal standard or inquiry" for pretext cannot be separated
from the inquiry of what a reasonable officer would do under the
circumstances.
Thus, if the pretext standard is truly an objective
standard, which looks to the usual or routine police practice for
what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do (as it must), the
subjective intent of the officer has no relevance.

Subjective

motivation (whether good or bad) simply has no bearing on what is
the usual police practice, which will necessarily be established
through the detaining officer's testimony, the testimony of other
officers, and documentary evidence concerning departmental
policy.

For example, when a pretext challenge is made to a stop

for failure to signal before making a turn, it does not matter
that the officer also had a "hunch" the driver might be involved
in a recent burglary; the only consideration is whether officers
routinely stop for that traffic violation.

6

State v. Smith, 781

P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 1989) (stop for failing to signal before
making turn not pretextual, as "this is the type of clear cut
traffic violation for which officers routinely stop citizens and
issue citations;" "fact that [officer]'s attention was initially
drawn to the defendant's car because of what he considered
suspicious activity in a high-crime area does not insulate the
defendant from being stopped for a traffic violation").

Nor

would it be of any consequence that the officer in the foregoing
scenario had no interest beyond the traffic violation in making
the stop; again, the only consideration is whether the stop
comports with usual police practice.
In sum, although the majority has genuinely sought to
clarify the pretext doctrine, the State agrees with defendant
that its holding regarding evidence of the officer's subjective
intent is extremely confusing and requires clarification.
Because consistent and intelligent application of the pretext
doctrine in the lower courts depends on clear direction from this
Court, and since the Lopez decision will likely represent the
seminal case from this Court on the pretext doctrine, the Court
should grant rehearing on the subjective intent issue, request
additional briefing from the parties, and restore the case to the
calendar for reargument.

Utah R. App. P. 35(c).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant
rehearing only on the issue of the relevance of the officer's
subjective intent.

The Court should request additional briefing
7

from the parties on that issue and restore the case to the
calendar for reargument.

Utah R. App. P. 35(c).
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